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The aim for storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) either in wet or in dry storage systems is to ensure general safety objective s are
met throughout a desired storage period. Staff at the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), in collaborations with part ners
at other national laboratories, industry research organizations, and the University of South Carolina (UofSC), have performed
materials aging testing and analyses, and have established nuclear materials aging management programs to support extended
periods of safe storage of research reactor (RR) SNF and of commercial power reactor (PR) SNF pending ultimate disposal.
Several example challenges include susceptibility of aluminum SNF from research reactors to corrosion in poor quality water ( wet
storage). In dry storage, aluminum SNF can release hydrogen via radiolysis of the hydrated oxides on the aluminum cladding.
Austenitic stainless steel canisters used for dry storage are susceptible to chloride -induced stress corrosion cracking (outside-in
attack) that threaten the confinement boundary provided by the canister. This paper further describes these challenges, amon g
others, and the formulated solutions to support extended safe storage of SNF.

Introduction
The nuclear fuel cycle for fission reactors spans the set of functions
and processes from the initial mining of uranium through to the
permanent disposal of the spent fuel itself, or, if reprocessed to recover
useful species, a waste form for disposal in a repository (see Figure 1).
An important stage in the back end of this cycle is the storage of the
spent nuclear fuel (SNF) which can be in a wet storage system (e.g., a
pool or water basin) or in a dry storage system (e.g., stainless steel
canisters with radiation shielding overpacks on a concrete pad outside).

Figure 2. Research Reactor (RR) and Power Reactor (PR)
Fuel in Storage Systems
dual-purpose canisters1 (DPC) made of stainless-steel numbering over
3000 DPCs [1].
Figure 1. Stages in a Generic Nuclear Fuel Cycle for a PR
with Reprocessing [courtesy of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission]

The U.S. Department of Energy - Environmental Management (DOE
-EM) office is responsible for the receipt and storage pending disposition
of spent nuclear fuel that was used in research and test reactors
worldwide that contains U.S. origin and certain non-U.S. origin enriched
uranium. This foreign and domestic RR fuel is primarily aluminumbased, aluminum-clad fuel that is being stored in L Basin, a water basin
at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina. Additional
aluminum fuel, the majority of which originated from the Advanced Test
Reactor, is in dry storage in the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF) at
the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) at the
Idaho National Laboratory (INL).

Figure 2 shows examples of commercial power reactor (PR) fuel and
research reactor (RR) fuel and their wet and dry storage systems.
Following reactor service, the SNF is discharged to a pool for cooling,
for both power reactors (PR) and research reactors (RR). The SNF can
remain in pool storage for additional cooling and shielding of the
attendant decay radiation. In the U.S., PR fuel was originally intended to
be stored in the water pool several years prior to reprocessing. However,
the U.S. has followed a “once-through” (i.e., no reprocessing) nuclear
The lack of a federal geologic repository as the ultimate end state for
fuel cycle strategy since the late 1970’s, and this has led to interim
the
SNF
from PR and RR has led to de facto extended storage with no
storage in pools at full capacity or soon-to-be full pools at most of the
U.S. reactor sites, and in dry storage systems owned by utilities and certain end date.
licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). At
1
present, over 80,000 metric tonnes of heavy metal (MTHM) of SNF have
The DPC would be multi-purpose for storage, transportation, and
been discharged from PR in the U.S., of which nearly half is stored in disposal
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Common to both these reactor categories of fuel for both types (wet
and dry) of storage systems is the aim to maintain general safety
objectives throughout the storage period. The safety objectives are met
through the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) in the storage
systems, whose designs are predicated on the performance of the fuel in
the storage environment.
The general safety objectives listed below have been derived from
those prescribed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [2,
3] and the U.S. NRC requirements for dry storage systems as listed in its
Standard Review Plan for Dry Storage Systems [4]:
•
•
•
•
•

Maintain criticality safety
Maintain cooling of the fuel
Maintain radiation shielding
Maintain confinement
Maintain retrievability (on canister or fuel basis)

Specifications and limits (e.g., for fuel peak cladding temperature [4])
and aging management programs (e.g. in-service inspections) for the
fuel and SSCs of the storage systems can be prescribed to ensure these
safety objectives are met. The U.S. NRC regulates the wet and dry
storage of PR SNF and grants operating licenses for the storage
facilities.
This paper looks at selected aging materials challenges and solutions
supporting the extended storage safe storage of RR and PR in wet and
dry storage systems. The work of the Savannah River National
Laboratory (SRNL), including with its partnerships, is emphasized.

Aluminum-Clad RR SNF – Extended Wet Storage
Aluminum is a common material for RR fuel cladding used
worldwide, for RR fuel storage racks in basins, and in material systems
for neutron absorbers in PR SNF storage pools. In poor quality water,
aluminum is particularly susceptible to corrosion [5]. Control against
corrosion attack can be achieved by demineralization and filtration
systems to maintain low solids, low conductivity water, and within a
range of pH to minimize aluminum solubility. Using experiences of
corrosion in reactor systems, including the vast experience at the
Savannah River Site (SRS), guidelines were prepared by the
International Atomic Energy Agency [6] to prescribe limits for water
quality parameters important to corrosion control in water systems for
research reactors.
A broader interrogation of the set of systems, structures, and
components used to meet the general safety objectives for extended fuel
storage in the L Basin at SRS was performed in 2011 [7]. The overall
conclusion was that the fuel can be stored in L Basin, meeting the
general objectives for safe fuel storage for an additional 50 years and
beyond, contingent upon continuation of existing fuel management
activities and several augmented program activities. This work was
cited by the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board in its 2017 topical
report on the Management and Disposal of U.S. Department of Energy
(owned) Spend Nuclear Fuel [8].
The augmented program activities by SRNL and the Spent Fuel
Project Engineering organization at SRS have been the development and
deployment of non-destructive examination tools to perform enhanced
remote visual inspection of the stored aluminum SNF [9] (see Figure 3),
and of the containers storing the non-aluminum SNF in L Basin [10]. A
primary conclusion from the inspection report of 10 assemblies of
aluminum SNF verified that the fuel storage and management practices
avoid corrosion and furthermore mitigate existing corrosion of the fuel
[9]. Additional inspection of the containers for the non-aluminum SNF
in L Basin is in progress [10].
A separate investigation on aluminum-based materials in reactor
systems was the investigation on the corrosion performance of a Neutron
Absorber Material (NAM) by SRNL for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission [11]. The NAM is attached to stainless steel racks and used
for criticality control in PR spent fuel (storage) pools. The specific
NAM is a composite sheet containing a cermet core of boron
carbide (B4C) particles from 35 to 65 wt.% in aluminum (Al 1100)
powder, sandwiched between aluminum (Al100) sheets as shown in
Figure 4.

Figure 3. Fuel Inspection Table (top photograph) and an image
of a plate-design aluminum SNF assembly following 25-years’
storage in L Basin (bottom). The pitting corrosion damage
occurred prior to fuel receipt at L Basin; no change to the fuel
condition has occurred while in L Basin [9]

Figure 4. Laser Confocal Microscope montage image of a
cross-section specimen from a Neutron Absorber Material
(NAM) panel from the Zion Nuclear Power Plant Spent Fuel
Pool following 22 years’ of service [11]
Using standard electrochemical test methods, and immersion test
methods with special specimen preparation techniques, the corrosion
rates of the aluminum panel, and of the aluminum-based core materials
were determined at temperature and water chemistry conditions.
Arrhenius relationships were established to allow predictive modeling of
corrosion performance at long-term nominal (typical water quality for
spent fuel pool service) and at long-term base (spent fuel pool water
quality limits) water chemistries’ exposure, and at hypothetical transient
(off-normal) water chemistry and temperature exposure conditions.
Maintaining neutron absorber efficacy of the NAM is required
throughout service in the spent fuel pool. The results from the
electrochemical corrosion testing showed that the controlled water
chemistry conditions of typical Pressurized Water Reactor and Boiling
Water Reactor Spent Fuel Pools would allow very long service periods
for the NAM. In addition, the immersion testing showed a key result
that the core material (if exposed by loss of aluminum sheet clad) would
not corrode significantly to cause loss of the absorber material (B4C
particles) even under severe off-normal water chemistry and temperature
conditions for up to well over a week of exposure [11].

Aluminum-Clad RR SNF – Extended Dry Storage
An extensive body of work had been done at the Idaho National
Laboratory and the Savannah River National Laboratory in the late
1990s to develop the storage system and evaluate materials interactions
for DOE SNF in a standard canister destined for imminent (at that time)
repository disposal. A subset of this fuel, the highly-enriched aluminum
SNF, posed particular challenges to extended dry storage (> 50 years), as
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highlighted in a 2017 report [12] by the DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel
Working Group (SNFWG).
A primary challenge, unique to the aluminum-clad SNF vis-à-vis
zircaloy or stainless-steel-clad SNF, is the presence of hydrated oxides
of aluminum formed on the SNF cladding by virtue of irradiation and
wet storage service. These hydrated oxides can release hydrogen gas
under gamma radiation [12, 13]. Experiments and theory on hydrogen
release from boehmite and bayerite, two hydrated aluminum oxides, was
published by SRNL in 2014, demonstrating the phenomenon. Figure 5
displays the results of the computational chemistry theory modeling that
indicates hydrogen production is possible with energy input (e.g., via
gamma radiation) to the hydrated oxides.
A comprehensive set of activities to address the challenges from
drying and dry storage of aluminum SNF and establish the technical
bases for extended dry storage was sponsored by the DOE-EM, Office of
Technology Development beginning in late 2017. The work, led by
INL, and its partners of SRNL, UofSC and industry has been conducted
over the last several years. The work included additional first-time
radiolysis testing of hydrated oxides on aluminum substrates to build a
library of G-values for hydrogen generation; modeling of SNF-incanister system including the head-space gas evolution; and drying tests
for the technologies of vacuum drying and of forced-gas dehydration.
An example of the results of laboratory-scale testing work shows the
profound reduction of radiolytic hydrogen by drying of specimens with
hydrated oxides to promote removal of physisorbed waters and thermal
decomposition of the hydrated oxides (see Figure 6).

Figure 5. Energy barrier diagrams illustrating removal of a
hydrogen molecule (H2) from the hydrated oxides boehmite
(a) and bayerite (b). [figures reproduced from reference 13]

The lab-scale work and the technical bases for the drying and dry
storage of aluminum SNF have been largely completed - a status report
summarizes the key findings of the program to date [14]. A primary
conclusion is that sealed dry storage of aluminum SNF would not cause
flammable gas mixtures to evolve, and that the pressure rating of the
DOE Standard Canister for DOE RR SNF would not be exceeded under
extended dry storage. Additional recipes for drying with subsequent
radiolysis testing is in progress in FY22.

Zircaloy-clad PR SNF – Extended Wet Storage
Stainless steel and zirconium alloys are more resistant to corrosion
in water than aluminum. Zirconium cladding alloys are subject to
general corrosion with an adherent passive oxide film of ZrO2 that
grows with time in water at power reactor operating temperatures (e.g.,
288°C bulk core water temperature for Pressurization Water Reactors).
After discharge from the reactor and in pool storage, zirconium alloy and
stainless-steel claddings are highly resistant to corrosion due to their
robust passive oxide layers.
There are typically no technical
specifications or requirements for water chemistry to mitigate corrosion
of zirconium alloys in pool storage due to the relatively innocuous
environment of low temperature (nominal 40°C) water exposure vis-àvis reactor operation temperature exposure. Water clean-up is required
in pool storage to limit water radioactivity levels [6]; also keeping the
conductivity and water temperature low in pool storage will minimize
the intensity of electrochemical reactions [16].
New-build pools for PR SNF storage are not feasible given
construction and operating & maintenance costs. Dry storage of PR
SNF is the only cost-effective pathway for its extended storage pending
repository disposal.

Figure 6. Aluminum plate specimens with hydrated oxides loaded
in a “mini-canister” (top). Data of radiolytic hydrogen from the
mini-canister specimens with gamma dose for conditions of vacuum drying (“As-Corroded”) and heated air (220°C) (“As-Dried”),
as well as results for a much smaller sample with no drying
(“MURR”) (bottom) [figures reproduced from reference 15].
vendors, DOE – Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), and nuclear system
experts at the U.S. national laboratories.

Zircaloy-clad PR SNF – Extended Dry Storage
Circa 2009, with the 20-year initial licenses of PR fuel storage
facilities reaching expiration, and with the license application to the U.S.
NRC for the federal repository (Yucca Mountain Project) being vacated
by the U.S. government, the pathway to imminent permanent disposition
of SNF (and also High Level Waste from the U.S. defense production
mission) by repository disposal in the U.S. became uncertain, and the
technical bases for extended safe storage and re-licensing of storage
facilities was needed. This need was recognized by the broad nuclear
power industry with stakeholders of the U.S. NRC, electric power
utilities, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), SNF storage system

A gross bounding estimate for the period of extended dry storage of
PR SNF storage systems of “up to 300 years” was suggested by R.E.
Einziger of the U.S. NRC at that time, and various organizations worked
to identify “technical information gaps” in predicting aging materials
performance over such very long storage periods. The U.S. NRC
contracted SRNL to perform such a gap analysis, and the results were
published in an NRC contractor report (CR) [17].
Much work to provide the bases for extended dry storage (for at least
up to 40-year re-license being granted by the U.S. NRC) has been
completed. The remaining ongoing investigations including materials
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testing and analyses, and development and deployment of tooling and Conclusions
systems for inservice inspection are under work sponsored by EPRI, the
NRC, and DOE-NE in addition to work by the storage system vendors.
The approach to enable safe extended storage of SNF in wet or in
A common bi-annual meeting forum, the Extended Storage dry storage systems involves materials’ aging testing and analyses and
Collaboration Program is hosted by EPRI to share the information being establishment of aging management programs (e.g. inservice inspection
generated.
programs) to provide the technical underpinnings and support the
One materials’ aging challenge with key input provided by the demonstration that general safety objectives for storage are met
SRNL staff involves the phenomenon of Chloride-Induced Stress throughout the desired storage period in consideration of materials
Corrosion Cracking (CISCC). The CISCC phenomenon has a potential aging. Several challenges for extended storage of RR and PR SNF were
to occur at SNF canister weldments as this location has weld residual described as examples of work performed by materials scientists and
stresses. Deposits of chloride-containing marine salts and industry dust engineers to provide solutions to meet these challenges. The staff at the
may build up during outside storage, and with cooling of the canister Savannah River National Laboratory have had prominent roles in this
surface with time, the salts can deliquesce and form a brine to provide work sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Nuclear
the requisite conditions for CISCC. The growth of cracks could Regulatory Commission.
penetrate the nominal 5/8” thick steel shell of the canister to cause a loss
The practical experience and success in providing solutions for
in the confinement boundary of the canister.
nuclear systems positions SRNL well to solve future challenges.

Two aspects of this challenge include flaw mechanical stability
against loadings to avoid a large rupture of the canister, and the crack
growth rate (CGR) of CISCC cracks, should they form. The mechanical
stability of flaws in a canister subject to in-service loads and weld
residual stresses was rigorously analyzed by SRNL [18]. Various
locations and sizes of flaw postulates including throughwall flaws
(assumed a breach of the canister) were considered. As shown in Figure
7, the size of the most limiting location flaw (perpendicular to a
circumferential weldment) and under the accident loading conditions and
with weld residual stress, was over several inches.
The second aspect, the CGR prediction, is an important input for
flaw disposition, should flaws be detected in a canister (none have to
date of this paper). A team of staff from Sandia National Laboratories,
Dominion Engineering, Inc., and SRNL, defined a temperature-based
CGR that may be used to project the future growth of a flaw [19]. This
work was an important part of the technical bases for an ASME code
case for inservice inspection of the canisters [20, 21]. The code case is
now available for utilities to adopt into their specific aging management
programs for their fuel storage installations to allow their re-licensing
and continued operation.
There has been additional important work by SRNL staff for safe dry
storage of PR SNF. In 2014, the staff organized a workshop of an expert
team to evaluate the impact of hydriding on the zircaloy-clad SNF for
storage and transportation [22]. An international consensus code for
drying SNF [23], shepherded by SRNL, was recently published by
ASTM International to provide guidance for drying the SNF in the first
place!

Figure 7 - Failure Assessment Diagram evaluation for flaw
stability in a SNF canister showing long flaws remain stable
even under bound accident conditions including weld residual
stress (RS) [reproduced from reference 18]
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